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Stability of Time Preferences
* 
 
Individuals frequently face intertemporal decisions. For the purposes of economic analysis, 
the preference parameters assumed to govern these decisions are generally considered to 
be stable economic primitives. However, evidence on the stability of time preferences is 
notably lacking. In a large field study conducted over two years with about 1,400 individuals, 
time preferences are elicited using incentivized choice experiments. The aggregate 
distributions of discount factors and the proportion of present-biased individuals are found to 
be unchanged over the two years. At the individual level, the one year correlations in 
measured time preference parameters are found to be high by existing standards, though 
some individuals change their intertemporal choices potentially indicating unstable 
preferences. By linking time preference measures to tax return data, we show that identified 
instability is uncorrelated with socio-demographics and changes to income, future liquidity, 
employment and family composition. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  C93, D01, D03, D11, D91 
  





Stephan Meier  
Columbia University 
Graduate School of Business 
710 Uris Hall 
3022 Broadway 
New York, NY 10027 
USA 
E-mail: sm3087@columbia.edu   
 
                                                 
* We are grateful to Nageeb Ali, James Andreoni, Richard Carson, Julie Cullen, Lorenz Goette, Yoram 
Halevy, Glenn Harrison, Ayana Johnson, Muriel Niederle, Lise Vesterlund, Michelle White, Chris 
Wignall, seminar and conference participants at Cornell University, University of California, San Diego, 
University of California, Santa Barbara, the North America ESA Meeting 2009, Universitat Pompeu 
Fabra Barcelona, Stanford University and University of Pittsburgh for helpful comments and 
discussions; and to the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston for financial assistance. The views expressed 
in this paper are, however, those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve 
System or the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. Benjamin Levinger provided excellent research 
assistance. Special thanks to Marques Benton (Department of Public and Community Affairs, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston) for all his help. 1 Introduction
\...one does not argue over tastes for the same reason that one does not argue over the
Rocky Mountains { both are there, will be there next year, too, and are the same for all
men." (Stigler and Becker, 1977, p. 76)
Individuals are frequently faced with intertemporal decisions. From larger decisions such as
how much to save for retirement, and how much to borrow on credit cards, to smaller decisions
such as whether or not to have dessert, individuals are required to make trade-os over time.
The preference parameters governing these decisions, that is intertemporal preferences, are
generally assumed to be static economic primitives. Economic analysis eectively proceeds
from this basis: if changes in intertemporal choice behavior are observed (e.g., if consumers
borrow more this year than last), then relative prices or budget constraints must have changed,
but preferences remained the same.
It is crucial to know whether time preferences are indeed stable.1 Though unstable intertem-
poral preferences can be incorporated into theoretical models of economic decision-making,
empirical analysis is hampered by such instability. Unstable intertemporal preferences would
imply that preference parameters have to be separately measured and accounted for in each time
period. As such, it is dicult to pin down time-varying preferences and responses to changing
economic incentives solely from time-varying behavior. In their seminal work on stable pref-
erences, Stigler and Becker (1977) make the key point that attributing changes in behavior to
changes in preferences leaves too many degrees of freedom to be economically interesting.
Despite its clear importance for economic research, relatively little is known about the sta-
bility of time preferences.2 A few psychological and economic studies show correlation between
1As Horowitz (1992) points out, time preference stability, or \intertemporal stationarity," is a separate con-
cept from dynamic consistency. Stability is neither a necessary nor sucient condition for dynamic consistency.
Dynamic consistency, or the notion that planned and actual behavior should coincide, has been studied in
several experiments including Horowitz (1992) and Harrison et al. (2005a).
2Readers interested in the temporal stability of other preferences are referred to Andersen et al. (2008b) who
analyze stability of experimentally elicited risk preferences for a sample of 97 Danes and nd evidence in favor
of stable risk preferences. Stability of other-regarding preferences have been investigated, for example, by Benz
and Meier (2008); de Oliveira et al. (2009).
1experimental measures of patience and future behaviors such as scholastic achievement (Mischel
et al., 1989), borrowing (Meier and Sprenger, 2010) and credit default (Meier and Sprenger,
2009). This evidence, however, is indirect in that stability is identied only under the assump-
tion that a common set of preferences drives both experimental responses and later real-world
behavior.
Contrary to the ndings noted above, other research shows low (or no) correlation between
measured time preferences and intertemporal decisions such as diet and exercise behavior (see
e.g., Chabris et al., 2008). Such low correlation in cross-situational behaviors has been inter-
preted by psychologists as evidence of instability in personality traits or preferences (see e.g.,
Mischel, 1968; Ross and Nisbett, 1991).3 Additionally, experimentally measured time preference
parameters vary broadly. Frederick et al. (2002) review the literature and nd annual discount
factors (rates) ranging from one (zero percent) to virtually zero (innity percent), possibly sug-
gesting instability in time preferences. The authors propose that at least part of the variance
in ndings is due to diering experimental methodology and diering sample selection. They
also note that \no longitudinal studies have been conducted to permit any conclusions about
the temporal stability of time preferences" (Frederick et al., 2002, p. 391). To our knowledge,
the lack of longitudinal time preference studies persists to the present.4
The current study begins to ll this gap. In consecutive years, we elicit the time preferences
of around 1,400 adults from the same subject pool using identical incentivized experimental
methods. The experimental methodology was designed to elicit individual discount factors and
present-biased preferences (see, e.g., Laibson, 1997; O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). This repre-
sents the largest study of time preferences with actual payments conducted to date, making it
an ideal data set for testing time preference stability. The study was conducted at a tax-ling
3Low correlation between dierent indicators of time preference does not necessarily mean that time pref-
erence are unstable. Decisions such as smoking and borrowing might be governed by a number of factors
independent of time preferences.
4In a study of dynamic consistency, Harrison et al. (2005a) have time preference data for 97 Danish individuals
that could be used to explore this topic. Observation of the presented data is not suggestive of stability in elicited
one month discount factors. Interested readers are referred to Figure 1C, data series A and A of Harrison et
al. (2005a).
2center and individuals granted us access to their tax ling data. Thus, we obtain objective in-
formation on economically relevant changes in income, unemployment and family composition.
Changes in economic variables such as income have long been thought to aect time preference
(see e.g., Fisher, 1930).5 Study participants are low income such that substantial proportional
income changes are observed and changes to employment and family composition are likely to
have important economic impacts. Additionally, the tax data also allow us to investigate the
inuence of future changes to liquidity on measured time preferences by analyzing the eects
of the magnitude and timing of tax refund receipts.
Our analysis yields three important results. First, the aggregate distributions of both dis-
count factors and present bias are indistinguishable across the two years of the study. Given
the wide historical variation in time preference parameter estimates from experimental studies
(Frederick et al., 2002), this demonstrates that when rigorously controlling both the experi-
mental methodology and the sample pool, one can obtain stable aggregate estimates over time.
Second, in an individual-level panel analysis, we demonstrate that 60 to 70 percent of the
variance in measured time preference parameters can be explained with individual xed ef-
fects. Additionally, the individual-level one-year correlations in measured time preferences are
strongly signicant and high by psychological standards (see e.g., Costa and McCrae, 1994).
These panel results are robust to controlling for longitudinal sample attrition, which is iden-
tied by exploiting dierences in the distance individuals live from the tax-ling center. The
third contribution explores the degree of instability in measured preferences. Some subjects
show substantial variation in their measured preferences over time. We nd that there exist no
demographic correlates for the direction of this instability, nor can one predict dierences with
economically relevant changes in income, unemployment, family composition or future liquidity.
We discuss potential interpretations of these results. Though one can obtain a stable distribu-
tion and high correlations at the individual level, the correlations are not perfect. The source of
any instability is dicult to pin down. As such, it is unknown whether standard experimental
5Additionally cross-sectional data show dramatic dierences in the rate of time preference between wealthy
and poor households (see Lawrance, 1991).
3measures are simply noisy or if there exist individuals with highly unstable preferences whose
instability is orthogonal to socio-demographics.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents our methodology for
experimentally eliciting time preferences and discusses design details. Section 3 presents results
related to stable preferences over time at the aggregate and individual level and discusses sources




Evidence in this paper comes from a eld study conducted in collaboration with the City of
Boston, at a Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) site in Roxbury, Massachusetts. There
are currently 22 such VITA sites in Boston, MA, providing free tax preparation assistance to
low-to-moderate income (LMI) households in specic neighborhoods in order to help them claim
valuable tax credits such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The VITA site in Roxbury
is Boston's largest and was established in 2001. Individuals who received tax assistance in 2007
and 2008 were administered identical, incentive-compatible choice experiments to elicit time
preferences, resulting in 1684 observations (890 in 2007 and 794 in 2008). Of the participants
in 2007, 250 again participated in 2008. That is, we obtain two time preference observations
for these individuals.
Conducting time preference experiments at a local VITA site allows us to match time
preference measures with tax data and demographic survey data. Individuals consented to our
accessing their tax ling data and, for participants in the choice experiments, to combining
their tax data with their time preference measures.
42.2 Measuring Time Preferences
Individual time preferences are elicited using identical incentivized choice experiments in both
years of the study (for similar approaches, see Coller and Williams, 1999; Harrison et al., 2002;
McClure et al., 2004; Dohmen et al., 2006; Tanaka et al., 2009; Burks et al., 2009; Benjamin
et al., 2009; Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2009). Individuals were given two multiple price lists and
asked to make various choices between a smaller reward ($X) in period t and a larger reward
($Y > $X) in period t +  > t. We keep ($Y ) constant and vary ($X) in two time frames: in
Time Frame 1, t is the present (t = 0) and  is one month ( = 1); in Time Frame 2, t is six
months from the study date (t = 6) and  is again one month ( = 1). The order of the two
time frames presented to participants was randomized. In both time frames $Y = $50 and $X
was varied from $49 to $22 (see the instructions in Appendix A.2).6
In order to provide an incentive for the truthful revelation of preferences, 10 percent of
individuals were randomly paid one of their choices as in many other studies (for comparable
methodologies and discussions, see, e.g., Harrison et al., 2002). This was done with a rae
ticket, which subjects took at the end of their tax ling and which indicated which choice, if
any, would result in payment. To ensure credibility of the payments, we lled out money orders
for the winning amounts on the spot in the presence of the participants, put them in labeled,
pre-stamped envelopes and sealed the envelopes. The payment was guaranteed by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston and individuals were informed that they could always return to the
heads of the VITA site where the experiment was run to report any problems receiving the
payments. Money orders were sent by mail to the winner's home address on the same day as
the experiment (if t = 0), or in one, six, or seven months, depending on the winner's choice.
All payments were sent by mail to equate the transaction costs of sooner and later payments.7
6Individuals were additionally asked to make choices between the present (t = 0) and in six months ( = 6)
in a third time frame. We opt to use only the (t = 0; = 1) and (t = 6; = 1) time frames in our primary
analysis in order to calculate discounting and particularly present bias in a standard way (see Ashraf et al.,
2006; Dohmen et al., 2006; Meier and Sprenger, 2010). Responses from the third time frame are added to the
analysis as a robustness test. Results are qualitatively unchanged (see Section 3.3).
7If individuals expect to move in the next seven months, they might question the likelihood that their mail
would be forwarded to their new address in a timely manner. As movers might therefore prefer payments in the
present for logistical reasons and not for reasons related to their underlying time preference, we ask individuals
5The payment procedure therefore mimicked a front-end-delay design (Harrison et al., 2005b).
The details of the payment procedure of the choice experiments were kept the same in the two
years and participants were fully informed about the method of payment.
The multiple price list setup enables us to measure two aspects of individuals' time prefer-
ences. We measure: (1) individual discount factors and (2) whether individuals show a dispro-
portionate preference for present rewards; that is, whether individuals are present-biased.
(1) Individual discount factor (IDF): We estimate monthly IDFs for the two time frames
by looking at the point, X, at which individuals switch from opting for the smaller, sooner
payment to the larger, later payment in a given price list.8 That is, a discount factor is taken
from the last point at which an individual prefers the sooner, smaller payment. As this gives
the point where sooner and later payments are approximately equally valued, X  IDF Y ,
we calculate IDF = X=Y .9 For example, if an individual prefers $45 today over $50 in one
month, but prefers $50 in one month over $40 today, we take $45 as the switching point and
the corresponding monthly discount factor of 45=50 = 0:90.
Making these calculations for the two multiple price lists yields two discount measures,
IDFt;, where t refers to the sooner payment time (zero or six months) and  refers to the
delay length (one month): IDF0;1, IDF6;1. The average of these monthly discount factors,
IDF, is used as the primary measure of discounting in our analysis.10
(2) Present Bias: The two time frames allow us to identify individuals who are dynamically
\Do you expect to move in the next 7 months?". However, whether individuals expect to move does not correlate
with elicited time preferences and does not aect our results.
8For individuals with multiple switching points, we interpret the rst switch point as the value of X. All
results presented are maintained when eliminating individuals with multiple switch points from the analysis
(see Section 3.3.)
9This formulation is equivalent to positing a linear utility function over the experimental outcomes and nor-
malizing extra-experimental consumption (i.e., background consumption) to zero. Responses in time preference
experiments may be aected by utility function curvature (see, e.g., Anderhub et al., 2001; Frederick et al.,
2002; Andersen et al., 2008a). We do not have complimentary risk experiments as in Andersen et al. (2008a) or
convex budgets as in Andreoni and Sprenger (2009a) to account for curvature. We do, however, ensure that our
results are maintained when accounting for a survey measure of risk attitudes previously validated in a large
representative sample (see Section 3.3).
10It should be noted that the price list methodology does not elicit point estimates of the IDF but rather
ranges within which the discount factors lie. Because our analysis is focused on individual responses to the same
experiment over time and not necessarily on precise estimation of the parameter measures, we do not control
for the interval nature of the data in our analysis.
6inconsistent in the sense that they show a bias towards present payouts (see, e.g., Laibson,
1997; O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). By comparing individual choices in Time Frame 1 (t = 0,
 = 1) with Time Frame 2 (t = 6,  = 1), we obtain a measure for whether individuals are
dynamically inconsistent. If a person is present-biased, i.e. disproportionately prefers present
payments, we would observe IDF0;1 < IDF6;1.11 We classify an individual as \Present-Biased
(=1)' if they exhibit this pattern.
2.3 Full Sample
Column (1) in Table 1 shows summary statistics for the 1684 study observations. Participants
earn, on average, approximately $16,000 per year. They are around age 40, female, African-
American, with less than a college education and have slightly less than 0.5 dependents. Around
10% of participants collected unemployment at some time during the previous calendar year
(and so reported for tax ling purposes). Participants receive, on average, federal tax refunds of
around $1,100 and around 40% will have their refunds deposited directly in their bank account.
Unlike age, income, dependents, unemployment and refund data which are precisely measured
from individual tax returns, participants' gender, race and college experience were collected
from an auxiliary demographic survey. A non-negligible proportion of observations, has at
least one of these values missing. Missing values for the indicator variables related to gender,
race and college experience are coded as the value of the majority and whether or not such
values are missing is controlled for in our analysis.
[Table 1 about here.]
The subject pool, though non-standard, comes to the VITA site for reasons other than the
experiment. This partially reduces the problem of subjects self-selecting into experiments (see
Levitt and List, 2007). Individuals may, of course, choose not to participate in the experiment
11To see that present-biased individuals would exhibit this pattern of discounting, we consider one formula-
tion of present bias, quasi-hyperbolic discounting. IDF0;1 and IDF6;1 capture both parameters of the quasi-
hyperbolic model:  and . IDF  =  if t = 0 and IDF  =  if t 6= 0. This results in IDF0;1 =  and
IDF6;1 = , such that IDF0;1 < IDF6;1 when an individual is present-biased ( < 1).
7once at the VITA site. Of all the individuals coming to the VITA site (2,366 in total), 71%
elected to participate in the experiment.
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 1 report summary statistics for non-participants and p-values
of t-tests for equal means between participants and non-participants. Examination of these
statistics allows us to assess the axes upon which individuals may select into the study. In-
dividuals appear to select on a variety of observable characteristics. Income, age, refund val-
ues, direct deposit, number of dependents and incomplete demographic survey responses all
dier signicantly between participants and non-participants. We control for all available
socio-demographic characteristics (i.e., selection on observables) in our analysis of aggregate
discounting (see Section 3.1).
Because there are 22 VITA sites around Boston, MA, each one is local to a specic neighbor-
hood. VITA site attendee demographics are therefore similar over time. Columns (4) and (5) of
Table 1 show summary statistics for participants in 2007 and 2008. Comparing the observable
characteristics shows that individuals are slightly older and that slightly more participants are
African-American, have lower refund values, are less likely to use direct deposit, and have some
missing demographic information in 2008 relative to 2007.12 No other demographic dierences
are signicant.
2.4 Panel Sample
Because the free tax preparation service is valuable, individuals return in subsequent years for
further tax preparation assistance. Of the 890 study participants in 2007, we were able to
measure time preferences again in 2008 for 250 returnees.13 A panel is created for these 250
individuals, allowing us to correlate individual preferences over time and to observe whether
changes to income, unemployment status, family composition or future liquidity correlate with
12The slightly higher age, lower refund values and lower direct deposit usage of the 2008 sample is likely
due to the 2008 Stimulus Payments which provided $300 rebates to older social security recipients who would
normally not le taxes. 10 percent of 2008 participants were over the age of 65 compared to only 4 percent of
2007 participants.
13Non-returnees either did not le taxes in a VITA site in Boston (N = 386), led in another VITA site in
Boston (N = 186), or led taxes in the Roxbury VITA site, but did not participate in the experiment (N = 88).
8changes in measured preferences.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for returnees and examines dierences in various char-
acteristics between returnees and non-returnees. Substantial dierences between returnees and
non-returnees exist along the axes of income, age, race, education, and incomplete demographic
survey information. Importantly, we nd no evidence of attrition based on time preferences.
Returnees and non-returnees have almost identical average levels of discounting and present
bias.
The panel of returnees is clearly a selected sample. For the purposes of this study, selective
attrition would be problematic if it was correlated with the stability of time preferences. One
would hope to nd a variable, plausibly orthogonal to the stability of preferences, correlated
with the probability of attrition. It is helpful that there are 22 VITA sites around Boston. Tax
assistance recipients generally use VITA sites local to their homes. We argue that the distance
that an individual lived from the Roxbury VITA site in 2007 is plausibly orthogonal to time
preference stability and may help to determine attrition.
We use tax ling information to obtain the zip code each individual used for their federal
tax return. We calculate the direct line distance from the center of an individual's tax ling
zip code to the center of Roxbury, MA 02119 where the VITA site is located. We additionally
note whether an individual uses a post oce box as opposed to a street address for tax-ling
purposes. Panel C of Table 2 indicates that distance does indeed correlate with attrition.
Individuals with zip codes more than 2 miles from Roxbury, MA were signicantly less likely to
return. Both returnees and non-returnees are equally likely to use a post oce mailing address.
We use distance as an exogenous determinant of sample attrition and use it to identify results
in our panel analysis. We additionally account for the possibility that attrition could be based
on 2007 demographics and 2007 time preferences (see Section 3.2).
[Table 2 about here.]
93 Results
The results are presented in three broad sections. To begin, we analyze the stability of the
distribution of estimated time preference parameters over the two years of the study at the
aggregate level. In a second section, we restrict our attention to the 250 individuals who
participated in the study twice. We discuss the extent to which individual responses correlate
over time, and explore the sources of any instability. Robustness tests are presented in a third
section.
3.1 Temporal Stability in Aggregate Time Preferences
When examining the same group of people through time, stability in the aggregate distribution
of time preferences is a necessary condition for stability in individual time preferences. If the
aggregate distribution of preferences is unstable, then individual preference parameters cannot
be xed. We examine two aggregate distributions of time preference parameters. First, because
the sample pools are similar in the two years of the study, we examine the distribution of all 1684
study observations. Given the wide historical variation of time preference parameters obtained
from dierent sample pools, this is a relevant avenue of exploration. Second, we examine the
aggregate distribution of the 250 returnees who participated in the study twice.
Figure 1 plots histograms of IDF in the two years of the study for the two aggregate samples.
The distributions are remarkably similar over time. For the full sample (Panel A), the average
value for IDF is 0.79 in 2007 and 0.79 in 2008. For the returnees (Panel B), the average value
for IDF is 0.80 in 2007 and 0.80 in 2008. Non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum and sign rank
tests fails to reject the null hypotheses of equal distributions over the two years: for the full
sample z =  0:176; p = 0:86 and for the returnee sample zp = 0:067; p = 0:95.14
[Figure 1 and 2 about here.]
14Unless otherwise noted, the statistic z will refer to the test statistic of a Wilcoxon rank sum test and the
statistic zp will refer to the test statistic of a paired Wilcoxon sign rank test. Additionally, returnees are not found
to be dierent from non-returnees in the two years (2007: z =  1:302; p = 0:19; 2008: z =  0:831; p = 0:41).
10Figure 2 more closely examines the disaggregated measures of time preference: IDF0;1 and
IDF6;1. Kernel estimates of the densities of these measures over the two years are provided.
Echoing the result of Figure 1, the densities of each individual measure show remarkable stability
over the two years of the study. Wilcoxon rank sum tests again fail to reject the null hypotheses
of equal distributions over the two years.15 Apparent from Figure 2 is the substantial level of
present bias in the samples. The density for IDF0;1 has less mass at the higher levels of patience
than that for IDF6;1. Individuals are less likely to be patient in Time Frame 1 and more likely
to be patient in Time Frame 2. In fact, substantial proportions of the samples are classied as
being present-biased and this measure is stable as well. In 2007, 33 percent of all participants
and 33 percent of returnees are classied as Present-Biased (=1) while in 2008, 35 percent of
all participants and 32 percent of returnees are classied as Present-Biased (=1).
The obtained discount factor measures are, on average, low, but consistent with previous
research, which tends to nd low discount factors in experimental studies (see Frederick et al.,
2002). The level of present bias observed in our sample is also comparable to previous research.
Using similar techniques but dierent subject pools, Dohmen et al. (2006) and Ashraf et al.
(2006) nd a similar proportion of present-biased individuals, 28% and 27.5%, respectively.
In Table 3 we test the hypothesis of stable aggregate preferences in regression. With ordinary
least squares16, we regress IDF and Present-Biased (=1) on a constant and an indicator for the
year of study being 2008:
Time Preferencei = 0 + 11(Y ear = 2008)i + i
where Time Preferencei is either IDF or Present-Biased (=1) and 1(Y ear = 2008)i is an
indicator for the study year being 2008.
15For IDF0;1: z =  0:086; p = 0:93; zp = 0:281; p = 0:78. For IDF6;1: z = 0:430 p = 0:67; zp = 0:222; p =
0:82.
16The least squares specication allows for ease of coecient interpretation. However, IDF is censored and
Present-Biased (=1) is binary and so would be more appropriately estimated with a tobit estimator and a probit
or logit estimator, respectively. These estimates are provided in Appendix Table A1 (along with estimated
demographic coecients) and feature no qualitative dierences.
11Tests of aggregate time preference stability are t-tests on the estimated coecients ^ 1. The
size of ^ 1 relative to ^ 0 is an indicator of how much the mean level of time preferences changes
over time. Columns (1), (2), (6) and (7) of Table 3 indicate that for the full sample and the
sample of returnees ^ 1 is small relative to its respective constant, ^ 0, and is not signicantly
dierent from zero for both discounting and present bias. R2 values from these regressions
are virtually zero, as one would expect if the year of study had no explanatory power for the
parameter values.
[Table 3 about here.]
Because our study represents the largest incentivized experimental study of time preferences,
it may be of independent interest to examine the demographic correlates of obtained preference
measures. Table 3, columns (3), (4), (8) and (9) present the demographic correlates of our time
preference measures. In general, higher income, younger age and female gender are all associated
with signicantly higher IDF. In the full sample, college education and direct deposit usage
are also associated with signicantly higher IDF.17 Interestingly, refund values, as a measure of
future liquidity, are uncorrelated with both discounting and present bias. In both samples, older
individuals are found to be signicantly less likely to be present-biased and college educated
individuals are found to be signicantly more likely to be present-biased. Though this last
result is somewhat surprising, the remainder are in line with what one might expect in this
sample.
Such correlations are also presented in aggregate studies of preferences such as Harrison
et al. (2002) and Tanaka et al. (2009). For comparison, Tanaka et al. (2009) nd that older
and wealthier individuals are more patient and Harrison et al. (2002) nd that more educated
individuals are more patient. In both studies, gender and education are uncorrelated with
discount factors. Tanaka et al. (2009) show virtually no correlation between present bias and
17Individuals using direct deposit, receive their federal tax refunds in 7-10 business days, substantially faster
than mailed refund checks. Direct deposit usage may capture liquidity timing, but likely also measures nancial
sophistication and bank account holdership.
12demographic characteristics though, directionally, higher education is associated with more
present bias and age is associated with less present bias, as in our results.
The demographic correlates of time preferences are largely similar across the full sample and
the sample of returnees and the results are comparable to prior ndings. Notable, however,
are the low R2 values. Though the demographic correlates of preferences may be of interest
to researchers (and rms), these demographics explain less than 5% of the variance in time
preferences. In columns (5) and (10) of Table 3 we include individual xed eects for the
sample of returnees. R2 values increase dramatically. Roughly 60-70% of the variance in
measured time preference parameters can be accounted for with the inclusion of individual
xed eects.
The aggregate distributions of time preferences are stable. Across all regressions, there is
no impact of the year of study on measured preferences. Though a stable distribution could
be obtained without individual stability, the observation that individual xed eects explain
much of the heterogeneity in measured preferences is suggestive of stability at the individual
level. In the next section we focus our attention on the panel of individuals who participate in
the study twice and examine preference stability at the individual level.
3.2 Stability in Individual Time Preferences
In this section we examine the stability of discounting and present bias at the individual level.
The results are presented in two subsections. First, we examine the one-year correlations
in discount factors and present bias. Second, we identify instability in measured preferences
and explore the relationship between instability, socio-demographics and economically relevant
changes in income, future liquidity, employment and family composition.
3.2.1 Temporal Stability of Time Preferences
Of the 890 individuals who participated in 2007, 250 returned and participated again in 2008.
For the sample of 250 returnees the one-year correlation in IDF is  = 0:401 (p < 0:01). The
13one-year correlation in the measure Present-Biased (=1) is  = 0:160 (p < 0:05).18 Such
one year correlations are signicant and compare favorably to psychological benchmarks on
the stability of personality traits (for a detailed discussion, see Section 4). However, such
psychological stability studies rarely account for selective sample attrition. That is, it may be
the case that only individuals with stable preferences elect to return to the VITA site in 2008.
It may also be the case that socio-demographic characteristics reduce the obtained one-year
correlations in preferences. These possibilities are explored in Table 4.
In order to establish a baseline for evaluating the inuence of demographics and selection
on the stability of IDF, columns (1) and (4) of Table 4 estimate OLS regressions of IDF2008
on IDF2007 and Present-Biased2008 on Present-Biased2007 with a constant. Columns (2) and
(5) add all observable socio-demographic characteristics previously noted. Preferences remain
signicantly correlated over time and this correlation is virtually unchanged by the addition of
socio-demographics.
[Table 4 about here.]
Columns (3) and (6) of Table 4 estimate Heckman 2-step procedures to control for se-
lective attrition from the study. First, the inverse mills ratio is generated from a probit re-
gression of non-attrition (i.e. selection).19 We model attrition as a function of observable
socio-demographics, 2007 time preferences, and the distance an individual lives from the Rox-
bury VITA site.20 Under the assumption that distance is orthogonal to preference stability (as
discussed in Section 2.4), column (3) and (6) identies the temporal correlation in preferences
controlling for stability-driven attrition.21 Controlling for sample attrition does little to the
estimated correlations, though some precision is lost in the one-year correlation of present bias.
18When examining only individuals with unique price list switching points (N=203), the one-year correlation
in IDF is  = 0:457 (p < 0:01) and the one year correlation in present bias is  = 0:241 (p < 0:01). The
correlations for the dierent time frames separately is similar to the average. For IDF0;1;  = 0:402; p < 0:01.
For IDF6;1;  = 0:328;p < 0:01.
19The inverse mills ratio is a sucient statistic for the hazard of attrition (i.e., non-selection).
20We additionally include whether or not an individual used a PO Box for tax-ling purposes as a determinant
of attrition. Distance is found to be a signicant determinant of attrition. Full results of the Heckman selection
equation are presented in Appendix Table A2.
21In the language of instrumental variables, distance `instruments' for potentially endogenous selection.
14The results presented so far are suggestive of stable time preferences. Distribution of time
preferences are stable over time, individual xed eects explain large portions of the variance
in measured preference parameters and the one-year correlations compare favorably with psy-
chological ndings. However, the results are not so one-sided. Thirty to forty percent of the
variance in measured preferences is unaccounted for in our xed eects regressions and the one-
year correlations are far from perfect. In the next section we attempt to explore the sources of
this instability and whether there is any systematic changes in time preferences.
3.2.2 Sources of Instability
To explore changes in preferences over time, we rst dierence our time preference parameter
estimates to create the variables: IDF = IDF2008   IDF2007 and Present Bias = Present-
Biased (=1)2008 - Present-Biased (=1)2007: For the 250 returnees IDF has mean .005 (s.e. =
.0146), indicating that the dierence in discounting measures is on average small and tightly
centered around zero (the 95% condence interval for IDF is [ :0237;:0338]). Figure 3 plots
a histogram of IDF indicating that the distribution is generally symmetric, centered around
zero with large mass at or near zero, but a non-negligible number of extreme observations of
large changes in measured patience. Present Bias takes three possible values: -1, 0, 1. For
the 250 returnees, around 69 percent (n = 172) have Present Bias = 0, around 15 percent
(n=38) have Present Bias = -1 and 16 percent (n= 40) have Present Bias = 1.
[Figure 3 about here.]
For the observations with changes in discounting or present bias, we are interested to know
the source of this variation. In Table 5, we explore the determinants of instability in two ways.
In columns (1) and (3), logit regression are presented where the dependent variable is 1 if an
individual discount factor or present bias measure changed between 2007 and 2008. Columns
(2) and (4) present similar ordered logit regression where the dependent variable is an ordered
measure for the direction of the change in either discounting or present bias. These dependent
variables are regressed on all socio-demographic characteristics as well as measured changes in
15income, unemployment status, number of dependents, and refund values. We recognize that
this is not a comprehensive list of changes that could occur to these individuals. These data
are, however, chosen for two reasons. First, changes to these states represent potentially large
economic changes for low income individuals that are often argued to correlate with preferences
(see e.g., Lawrance, 1991) and could aect current and future liquidity constraints and so could
inuence experimental responses. Second, these data are directly observable from individual
tax-lings in subsequent years.22
[Table 5 about here.]
Importantly, given the socio-economic status of the sample, we observe individuals with
substantial changes to income, numbers of dependents, unemployment and refund values. The
median change in income was around $1,359 or around 7% higher income in 2008 compared
to 2007. Around 26% (65 of 250) of individuals experienced income increases of at least 30%.
Around 17% (43 of 250) of individuals experienced income decreases of at least 30%. With
respect to unemployment status, 220 of 250 show no change in unemployment while 12% (30 of
250) either cycle on to or o of unemployment in roughly equal proportions. With respect to
the number of dependents 217 of 250 show no change in the number of dependents claimed on
their tax ling, 6% (15) show a decrease in dependents and around 7% (18) show an increase
in dependents. Changes in refund values are on average small, around 2% ($15) more in 2008
versus 2007. Around 28% (69 of 250) of individuals experienced refund increases of at least
30% while 26% (64 of 250) experienced refund decreases of at least 30%.23
The results of Table 5 demonstrate that these large changes in economically relevant out-
comes as well as levels of socio-demographics are not systematically related to instability and
are virtually orthogonal to the direction of instability. Across 4 regressions, ve coecients are
signicant at the 10 percent level or higher. A 2 test of zero slopes is not rejected in any of
22Though one would hope to obtain changes that are somehow exogenous, exogeneity is certainly debatable
in this context. Individuals may choose to earn less money, withhold more taxes, have children, and apply for
unemployment if red.
2310% (25 of 250) of individuals had refunds of $0 in 2007.
16the four regressions. Additionally, the panel analysis presented in Section 3.1 can also be inter-
preted as an exploration of whether changes in income, unemployment and family composition
within individuals aect time preferences. Controlling for individual xed eects in Table 3,
we correlate changes in income, future liquidity, unemployment and family composition with
changes in discounting and present bias. Apparent from Table 3 columns (5) and (10) is that
observed changes in income, refund values, number of dependents and unemployment status
are virtually uncorrelated with changes in discounting or present bias.
3.3 Robustness Tests
In this section we examine the robustness of our obtained results: rst to an alternate measure
of time preferences, second to controlling for individual risk attitudes, and third to restricting
the sample to individuals with unique price list switching points.
In Table 6, we develop composite measures of time preference by including information from
a third experimental time frame. In this third time frame, subjects were asked to make decisions
between the present (t = 0) and six months from the study date ( = 6) (see instructions in
Appendix A.2). This provides a third measure of monthly discounting: IDF0;6.24 We use this
information to calculate a new average measure of discounting, IDF, and a composite measure
of present bias, Present Biased, which is one if IDF0;1 < IDF6;1 and IDF0;1 < IDF0;6.25
Panel A of Table 6 repeats the analysis of Tables 4 with these new measures. The results are
very similar to those previously obtained.
[Table 6 about here.]
Individual responses in time preference choice experiments may be inuenced by utility
function curvature (Frederick et al., 2002; Andersen et al., 2008a). Under expected utility,
24Kernel density estimates of IDF0;6 in 2007 and 2008 for the full sample and the sample of returnees show
stability as well and are provided in Appendix Figure A1.
25Consider again a ; discounting model (e.g., Laibson, 1997) where IDF0;1 =  and IDF0;6 = 1=6. If
 < 1, then IDF0;1 < IDF0;6. We account for the interval nature of measured discount factors when making
this classication.
17curvature (i.e., diminishing marginal utility) generates risk aversion. As such, some experi-
mental methodologies control for utility function curvature by eliciting risk preferences using
secondary experiments (Andersen et al., 2008a) or by providing convex decision environments
(Andreoni and Sprenger, 2009a). While our experimental environment was not conducive to
either of these techniques we were able, however, to collect survey information on risk attitudes
previously validated with a representative sample (Dohmen et al., 2005). Participants answer
the following question on an 11 point scale: \How willing are you to take risks in general? (on
a scale from \unwilling" to \fully prepared"). In Table 6 Panel B, we focus attention on indi-
viduals who answered this question in both years (N = 136) and control for the change in risk
attitudes over the two years.26 Andersen et al. (2008b) demonstrate stability in experimentally
measured risk preferences. Our data echo this result. The one-year correlation in risk attitudes
is substantial,  = 0:557 (p < 0:01), and the change in risk attitudes has mean 0.206 (s.e.
0.215). Controlling for changing risk attitudes, we again nd that discounting and present bias
are signicantly correlated over time at the individual level.
Some individuals have more than one price list switch point, making it impossible to ratio-
nalize their responses with standard notions of time preference.27 Such subjects are normally
either excluded from analysis, or their rst switching point is the one examined. In the main
part of our study we have taken the latter approach. In Table 6 Panel C, we repeat the analysis
of Tables 4 using only the 203 individuals who have unique switching points in both years of
the study. Because of this sample restriction criteria, we are unable to control for selective
attrition as having a unique switch point in 2008 requires that an individual be a returnee. The
results of Panel C of Table 6 are again consistent with our previous ndings: discounting and
present bias are signicantly correlated over time at the individual level.
26Controlling for changing risk attitudes allows us to control for the possibility that a stable distribution of
measured discount factors could be generated by unstable time preferences and equally unstable (but opposite)
risk preferences.
27For example, at a low interest rate a person might prefer the sooner payment; at a moderate interest rate
they switch to preferring the later payment; and then at a high interest rate they switch back to preferring
the sooner payment. Interestingly, this inconsistency is correlated over time at the individual level. Results
available from the authors on request.
184 Discussion
A relevant issue in the discussion of preference stability is the correlation or stability that one
might expect. Though the aggregate distributions of preferences are virtually unchanged over
the two years and obtained correlations are signicant, the correlations are far from perfect.
Interpretation of the degree of temporal stability depends somewhat on one's expectations for
our sample.
There is substantial discussion in the psychological literature as to whether the researcher's
prior should be zero or perfect correlation (see e.g., Bem, 1972). A long-standing debate in
psychology has generated a large amount of evidence indicating that the correlation of behavior
in similar, though slightly distinct, situations rarely exceeds 0.2 to 0.3 (Mischel, 1968). Such
\low" cross-situational correlations were taken as evidence against trait stability by situational
psychologists.28 Because our experiment is identical in the two years, this is not necessarily a
good benchmark against which to measure stability. In psychological personality trait studies,
the temporal correlation of `Big Five' personality characteristics is found to be as high as 0.6
to 0.8 (Costa and McCrae, 1994). However, measures for such traits are generally obtained
from aggregating hundreds of survey questions. Similar to single cross-situational measures, on
smaller subsets or individual questions one could expect temporal correlations in the range of
0.2 to 0.3 (see e.g., Block, 1971; Jessor, 1983).29 Judged against this psychological benchmark,
our temporal correlation of nearly 0.4 for IDF, obtained from two experimental measures, is
high and our obtained correlation for present bias is in line with psychological ndings.
In evaluating the size of the correlation found in our study, one also has to keep in mind that
our participants dier substantially from participants in most previous studies. Most studies
in psychology and in experimental economics use undergraduates as subjects while we conduct
28It has been shown that aggregate measures built up from various separate behaviors can yield substantially
higher cross-situational correlations (for discussion and examples, see Epstein, 1979; Benz and Meier, 2008).
29These relevant studies are discussed in Costa and McCrae (1994) and Epstein (1979), who provide excellent
surveys of stability studies in psychology. Both cited studies present median intertemporal correlation coe-
cients over a number of single personality measures and nd that the majority of correlations are around or
below 0.3, specically at longer time horizons.
19our choice experiments with low-to-moderate income individuals. These individuals' economic
circumstances can, themselves, be very unstable. For example, as discussed in Section 3.2.2,
43% of our returnee sample had income changes of at least 30%. Given these unstable circum-
stances, the estimated stability of time preferences is surprising. It is also important to note
that substantial changes in circumstances, like income, employment, family composition and
future liquidity, are virtually unrelated to changes in measured preferences.
Given that the one-year correlation in measured preferences compares favorably with prior
research, one can discuss potential sources of stability. One possibility is that individuals
simply recall their prior year choices and reproduce them. The correlation in measured time
preferences is, however, unlikely to be driven by such recollection. First, the implemented
choice experiments likely represent a minor event in participants' lives. The decisions are
completed along with a host of other VITA site intake survey and tax information in preparation
for tax ling. Second, the time delay in between experiments is large. The average delay
between the 2007 and 2008 choice experiments was 363 days (s.d. 23). Third, subjects show
limited ability to recall substantially more important information. Of the 250 returnees, 179
responded to a supplementary survey question asking whether or not they received the Earned
Income Tax Credit in the prior year. 62.6 percent of respondents (112 of 179) either did not
remember receiving the EITC or recalled incorrectly. Given that EITC values for the recipient
returnees averaged around $1,400 and that the VITA sites are advertised under the banner of
helping claim important tax credits, recollection of EITC receipt should be much easier than
recollection of choice experimental responses. Fourth, failure to recall EITC receipt or failure to
correctly recall EITC receipt does not correlate with experimental consistency.30 Additionally,
the temporal stability of the aggregate distribution of time preferences for individuals who
participated in the choice experiments only once and therefore couldn't recollect their choice
(N = 1184 in the Full Sample), also indicate that a willingness to be consistent cannot explain
30The correlation between not recalling and IDF is  0:0045 and between not recalling and Present Bias
is  0:0089. The correlation between recalling incorrectly and IDF is  0:0069 and between recalling incorrectly
and Present Bias is 0:0108. None of these correlations are signicant.
20the stability.
Though the one-year correlations in measured preferences are notable, there are still sub-
stantial proportions of participants who show instability. As this instability cannot be explained
by either socio-demographics or changes to income, unemployment, future liquidity, or family
composition, the source of this instability remains largely unknown. One possibility is that
changes in measured preferences are partially accounted for by measurement error. Indeed,
given the structure of the employed multiple price list task, this is plausible. Switching one
row lower in 2008 compared to 2007 implies a measured discount factor dierence of between
0.04 and 0.14 (see Appendix A.2 for details). Perhaps with a more precise experimental mea-
sure higher correlations could be obtained. Another possibility is that short-lived liquidity and
credit shocks separate from the annual changes we measure could be partially determining ex-
perimental responses. For example, if a subject receives an unexpected bill for which they need
immediate funds, this could impact their experimental responses. Given the low socio-economic
status of our observed sample, this is another plausible source of experimental instability. How-
ever, one would then expect to nd that future liquidity measures such as refund values and
changes in refund values would correlate with instability, which we do not. A third possible
explanation is that there exist individuals with fundamentally unstable time preferences and
that this instability is simply independent of any socio-demographic measure to which we have
access.
5 Conclusion
Economic analysis of intertemporal decisions is predicated on the notion that time preferences
are stable primitives. Though time preference stability is a standard assumption, relatively little
research in economics exists on the topic and a large related literature in psychology disputes
the notion that there are stable personality traits or preferences. In the largest experimental
study of time preferences undertaken to date, we test time preference stability at both the
aggregate and individual level. Using the same incentivized, intertemporal choice experiments
21and the same subject pool in two years, our results show that distributions of time preference
parameters are stable over time, individual xed eects explain large portions of the variance
in parameter measures, and the one-year individual level correlations are high by psychological
standards. However, the one-year correlations are far from perfect and 30 to 40 percent of
the variance in preference parameters is unexplained. Notably, changes in time preferences are
found to be largely independent of socio-demographics and changes to income, unemployment,
family composition and future liquidity (all taken from individuals tax returns). Potential
explanations for instability include measurement error and the possibility that some individuals
have fundamentally unstable time preferences.
Finding the degree of stability in experimentally elicited time preferences we obtain supports
two broad lines of economic research, one theoretical and one experimental. Much attention
has been given to the low cross-situational correlation in behavior (Ross and Nisbett, 1991) and
the wide variation in time preference parameter estimates resulting from experimental methods
(Frederick et al., 2002). Our results indicate that, when rigorously controlling the sample pool
and methodology, experimental procedures can yield stable aggregate parameter measures. This
nding provides necessary support for theoretical developments based on aggregate assumptions
of stable preferences. It also helps validate the current experimental trend towards correlating
experimental time preference parameter measures with real-world behaviors (Ashraf et al.,
2006; Meier and Sprenger, 2010). This line of research requires that experimentally measured
preferences are stable enough to be usefully correlated with extra-experimental behavior. Given
that these arguments rarely include precise estimates of marginal eects, signicant correlation
in measured preferences through time indicates that the obtained relationships may be more
than just point-in-time correlations.
Finding the degree of instability we obtain also has implications for future research. First, in
our discussion of instability, we note that the multiple price list methodology may be particularly
sensitive to measurement error as small changes in price list switching points imply large changes
in preferences. Future studies of stability of time preferences might nd more stability if using
22more precise techniques for eliciting time preferences. Second, our results cannot rule out
that there are some people with fundamentally unstable intertemporal preferences. Identifying
these individuals, attempting to understand the source of their instability and modeling their
decisions are important next steps.
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26Table 1: Summary Statistics for Participants and Non-Participants / for 2007 and 2008 Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Participation in Study Sample in Dierent Years
Participants Non-Participants t-test 2007 2008 t-test
Panel A: Socio-Demographics
Adjusted Gross Income 16269.30 17682.04 p < .05 16795.88 15679.06 p = .11
(14231.29) (15930.08) (13834.64) (14649.4)
Federal Refund 1122.8 983.6 p < .05 1217.21 1016.97 p < .01
(1552.7) (1481.92) (1506.59) (1597.13)
Direct Deposit (=1) .38 .30 p < .01 .43 .34 p < .01
(.49) (.46) (.49) (.47)
# Dependents .45 .37 p < .05 .49 .42 p = .10
(.81) (.74) (.82) (.80)
Unemployment (=1) .09 .10 p = .66 .10 .09 p = .56
(.29) (.30) (.30) (.29)
Age 40.18 42.76 p < .01 38.33 42.26 p < .01
(15.69) (17.32) (15.03) (16.16)
Over 65 (=1) .07 .12 p < .01 .04 .10 p < .01
(.25) (.33) (.20) (.30)
Male (=1) .34 .37 p = .18 .35 .34 p = .57
(.47) (.48) (.48) (.47)
African-American (=1) .79 .79 p = .94 .77 .81 p < .10
(.41) (.41) (.42) (.39)
College Degree (=1) .12 .11 p = .73 .12 .11 p = .60
(.32) (.31) (.33) (.32)
Gender Imputed (=1) .08 .11 p < .01 .05 .10 p < .01
(.26) (.32) (.22) (.30)
Race Imputed (=1) .08 .10 p = .12 .06 .10 p < .01
(.28) (.30) (.24) (.31)
Education Imputed (=1) .10 .14 p < .01 .08 .13 p < .01
(.30) (.35) (.27) (.33)
Panel B: Time Preferences
IDF .79 .79 .79 p = .38
(.21) (.21) (.21)
Present-Biased (= 1) .34 .33 .35 p = .56
(.47) (.47) (.48)
# of Observations 1684 682 890 794
Notes: Table shows means of socio-demographics. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Column (3) shows p-values of t-tests for
equal means between columns (1) and (2). Column (6) shows p-values of t-tests for equal means between columns (4) and (5).




Adjusted Gross Income 15458.43 20219.75 p < :01
(13654.82) (13728.94)
Federal Refund 1183.42 1303.72 p = .29
(1503.42) (1514.25)
Direct Deposit (=1) .41 .47 p = .12
(.49) (.50)
Age 36.8 42.2 p < :01
(14.63) (15.39)
Over 65 (=1) .03 .09 p < :01
(.16) (.28)
Male (=1) .34 .38 p = .30
(.47) (.49)
African-American (=1) .75 .82 p < :05
(.43) (.38)
College Degree (=1) .10 .16 p < :05
(.31) (.37)
Number of Dependents .51 .43 p = .19
(.85) (.72)
Unemployment (=1) .10 .10 p = .70
(.29) (.31)
Gender Imputed (=1) .07 .01 p < .01
(.25) (.11)
Race Imputed (=1) .08 .03 p < .01
(.27) (.17)
Education Imputed (=1) .10 .04 p < .01
(.3) (.19)
Panel B: Time Preferences
IDF2007 .78 .80 p = .25
(.21) (.22)
Present-Biased (=1)2007 .33 .33 p = .89
(.47) (.47)
Panel C: Distance
Less than 1 mile .31 .36 p = .19
(.46) (.48)
1 - 2 Miles .34 .37 p = .33
(.47) (.48)
More than 2 miles .35 .27 p < :05
(.48) (.44)
PO Box (=1) .02 .02 p = .58
(.15) (.13)
# of Observations 640 250
Notes: Table shows means of variables in 2007. Standard deviations in parenthesis.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 4: Temporal Stability of Individual Time Preferences
Dependent Variable: IDF2008 Present-Biased (=1)2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS Heckman OLS OLS Heckman
IDF2007 0.383*** 0.376*** 0.368***
(0.056) (0.059) (0.071)
Present Biased2007 0.159** 0.128** 0.121*
(0.062) (0.063) (0.064)
AGI / 10K 0.004 0.002 -0.017 -0.034
(0.010) (0.016) (0.023) (0.035)
Fed. Refund / 10K -0.028 -0.049 0.031 -0.109
(0.119) (0.164) (0.284) (0.365)
Direct Deposit (=1) 0.008 0.006 -0.028 -0.046
(0.026) (0.029) (0.062) (0.069)
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.004* -0.006*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Over 65 (=1) 0.069 0.059 0.128 0.064
(0.055) (0.075) (0.132) (0.170)
Male (=1) 0.031 0.029 0.072 0.067
(0.028) (0.029) (0.067) (0.067)
African-American (=1) 0.007 0.001 -0.003 -0.037
(0.033) (0.044) (0.080) (0.097)
College Degree (=1) 0.019 0.016 0.169** 0.148*
(0.034) (0.037) (0.082) (0.089)
Number of Dependents 0.027 0.032 0.014 0.047
(0.026) (0.038) (0.061) (0.082)
Unemployment (=1) 0.015 0.015 0.175* 0.175*
(0.041) (0.040) (0.099) (0.099)
Constant 0.498*** 0.498*** 0.561 0.268*** 0.413*** 0.783
(0.046) (0.073) (0.350) (0.036) (0.124) (0.626)
Selection Equation No No Yes No No Yes
R-squared 0.161 0.175 0.026 0.083
# of Observations 250 250 890 250 250 890
Censored Observations - - 640 - - 640
Uncensored Observations - - 250 - - 250
Notes: Coecients of OLS and Heckman 2-Step regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. Full results of
the Heckman selection equation are presented in Appendix Table A2. All socio-demographics are 2007 values.
Included in regression but omitted from table are separate indicator variables for whether race, gender or
education values are imputed.
Level of signicance: *p < 0:1, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01
30Table 5: Determinants of Instability
Dependent Variable: IDF IDF Direction  Present-Biased Present Bias Direction 
Changed (=1) (-1,0,1) Changed (=1) (-1,0,1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logit Ord. Logit Logit Ord. Logit
AGI / 10K -0.097 -0.041 0.056 -0.009
(0.115) (0.089) (0.113) (0.101)
Fed Refund / 10K 2.078 1.602 1.652 0.286
(1.545) (1.220) (1.417) (1.363)
Direct Deposit (=1) 0.074 -0.057 0.163 -0.007
(0.316) (0.251) (0.289) (0.275)
Age -0.028** 0.000 0.003 -0.003
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Over 65 (=1) 0.742 -0.199 -0.427 0.234
(0.647) (0.525) (0.645) (0.575)
Male (=1) 0.642* 0.455* -0.078 0.224
(0.348) (0.271) (0.312) (0.294)
African-American (=1) 0.438 -0.072 0.218 -0.036
(0.397) (0.319) (0.378) (0.354)
College Degree (=1) -0.176 -0.011 -0.349 0.226
(0.406) (0.332) (0.393) (0.369)
Number of Dependents -0.079 -0.178 0.083 0.168
(0.307) (0.253) (0.292) (0.278)
Unemployment (=1) 1.575* 0.220 0.508 0.041
(0.865) (0.544) (0.590) (0.579)
 (AGI / 10K) -0.225 0.024 -0.170 0.097
(0.172) (0.131) (0.154) (0.140)
 (Fed Refund / 10K) 0.418 0.024 1.556 -0.371
(1.036) (0.745) (1.026) (0.873)
 Number of Dependents 0.216 -0.312 0.691* 0.544
(0.432) (0.326) (0.389) (0.347)
 Unemployment (=1) -0.332 0.173 0.187 -0.078
(0.607) (0.460) (0.516) (0.507)
Constant 1.325** -1.218**
(0.631) (0.587)
Log-Likelihood -136.693 -268.796 -156.119 -224.153
Pseudo R-squared 0.078 0.015 0.051 0.018
Zero Slopes 2 23.04 8.22 16.70 8.13
(p=0.11) (p=0.96) (p=0.41) (p=0.96)
N 250 250 250 250
Notes: Logit regressions in columns (1) and (3). Ordered logit regressions in columns (2) and (4). Changed (=1) is a variable
which takes the value 1 if an individuals' IDF (column (1)) or present bias indicator (column (3)) changed between 2007
and 2008. The Direction  variables capture the direction of these changes. They are calculated as IDF Direction  =
sign(IDF2008   IDF2007) and Present Bias Direction  = sign(Present Biased2008   Present Biased2007). For example,
IDF Direction  is coded as -1 if an individual had lower IDF in 2008 compared 2007, 0 if there was no change, and 1 if
an individual had a higher IDF in 2008 compared to 2007. Standard errors in parentheses. All socio-demographics are 2007
values. Changes in socio-demographics are 2008 values minus 2007 values. Included in regression but omitted from table
are separate indicator variables for whether race, gender or education values are imputed. Imputed gender not included in
columns (1) and (3) as all three individuals with imputed gender had IDF Changed (=1) and Present-Biased Changed (=1).
Level of signicance: *p < 0:1, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:0131Table 6: Robustness Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Method: OLS OLS Heckman OLS OLS Heckman
Control Variables: No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Selection Equation: No No Yes No No Yes
Panel A: Composite Time Preference Measures
Dependent Variable: IDF 2008 Present   Biased (=1)2008
IDF 2007 0.387*** 0.381*** 0.379***
(0.055) (0.059) (0.069)
Present   Biased2007 0.165*** 0.122* 0.119*
(0.063) (0.065) (0.064)
Constant 0.520*** 0.514*** 0.533** 0.212*** 0.419*** 0.615
(0.047) (0.066) (0.269) (0.031) (0.114) (0.553)
N 250 250 250 250 250 250
Panel B: Inclusion of Risk Attitudes
Dependent Variable: IDF2008 Present-Biased (=1)2008
IDF2007 0.393*** 0.362*** 0.333**
(0.078) (0.084) (0.137)
Present Biased2007 0.236*** 0.241*** 0.255***
(0.084) (0.087) (0.088)
 Risk Measure 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.016 0.023 0.023
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Constant 0.484*** 0.539*** 0.678 0.272*** 0.369** -0.025
(0.066) (0.100) (0.550) (0.051) (0.170) (0.713)
N 136 136 136 136 136 136
Panel C: Restricted Sample of Unique Switchers
Dependent Variable: IDF2008 Present-Biased (=1)2008
IDF2007 0.447*** 0.428***
(0.061) (0.066)
Present Biased2007 0.240*** 0.185***
(0.068) (0.071)
Constant 0.435*** 0.446*** 0.236*** 0.493***
(0.050) (0.081) (0.038) (0.136)
N 203 203 203 203
Notes: Coecients of OLS and Heckman 2-Step regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. Full results
of the Heckman selection equation are presented in Appendix Table A2. Control variables are 2007 socio-
demographics as in Tables 3 and 4.
Level of signicance: *p < 0:1, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Panel A presents histograms of IDF for the full sample of all participants separately for 2007 (N=890)
and 2008 (N=794). Wilcoxon rank-sum test (H0: equal distributions over time): z =  0:176; p = 0:86. Panel
B presents histograms of IDF for the sample of returnees separately for 2007 (N=250) and 2008 (N=250).
Paired Wilcoxon sign rank test (H0: equal distributions over time): zp = 0:067; p = 0:95. Additionally,
returnees are found to be no dierent from non-returnees in the two years (2007: z =  1:302; p = 0:19; 2008:

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The gure presents a histogram of the change in IDF:  IDF = IDF2008   IDF2007 for the returnee
sample of 250 individuals.  IDF has mean 0.005 and standard error 0.015.
35A Appendix







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37Table A2: Attrition Probit
Dependent Variable: Returnee (=1)
(1)
Probit
Distance: More than 2 miles -0.197*
(0.102)






Adjusted Gross Income / 10K 0.106***
(0.036)
Federal Refund / 10K 0.872*
(0.458)










College Degree (=1) 0.129
(0.141)








# of Observations 890
Notes: Coecient of probit regression. Standard er-
rors in parentheses. Included in regression but omitted
from table are separate indicator variables for whether
race, gender or education values are imputed.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As a tax ler at this Volunteer Income Tax Assistance site you are automatically entered in a rae in which
you could win up to $50. Just follow the directions below:
How It Works: In the boxes below you are asked to choose between smaller payments closer to today and
larger payments further in the future. For each row, choose one payment: either the smaller, sooner payment
or the later, larger payment. When you return this completed form, you will receive a rae ticket. If you are
a winner, the rae ticket will have a number on it from 1 to 22. These numbers correspond to the numbered
choices below. You will be paid your chosen payment. The choices you make could mean a dierence in payment
of more than $35, so CHOOSE CAREFULLY!!!
RED BLOCK (Numbers 1 through 7): Decide between payment today and payment in one month
BLACK BLOCK (Numbers 8 through 15): Decide between payment today and payment in six months
BLUE BLOCK (Numbers 16 through 22): Decide between payment in six months and payment in seven
months
Rules and Eligibility: For each possible number below, state whether you would like the earlier, smaller
payment or the later, larger payment. Only completed rae forms are eligible for the rae. All prizes
will be sent to you by normal mail and will be paid by money order. One out of ten rae tickets will
be a winner. You can obtain your rae ticket as soon as your tax ling is complete. You may not
participate in the rae if you are associated with the EITC campaign (volunteer, business associate, etc.)
or an employee (or relative of an employee) of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston or the Federal Reserve System.
[Red Block; t = 0,  = 1]
TODAY VS. ONE MONTH FROM TODAY WHAT WILL YOU DO IF YOU GET A NUMBER BETWEEN
1 AND 7? Decide for each possible number if you would like the smaller payment for sure today or the larger
payment for sure in one month? Please answer for each possible number (1) through (7) by lling in one box
for each possible number.
Example: If you prefer $49 today in Question 1 mark as follows: X $49 today or $50 in one month
If you prefer $50 in one month in Question 1, mark as follows: $49 today or X $50 in one month
If you get number (1): Would you like to receive $49 today or $50 in one month
If you get number (2): Would you like to receive $47 today or $50 in one month
If you get number (3): Would you like to receive $44 today or $50 in one month
If you get number (4): Would you like to receive $40 today or $50 in one month
If you get number (5): Would you like to receive $35 today or $50 in one month
If you get number (6): Would you like to receive $29 today or $50 in one month
If you get number (7): Would you like to receive $22 today or $50 in one month
[Black Block; t = 0,  = 6]
TODAY VS. SIX MONTHS FROM TODAY WHAT WILL YOU DO IF YOU GET A NUMBER BETWEEN
8 AND 15? Now, decide for each possible number if you would like the smaller payment for sure today or the
larger payment for sure in six months? Please answer each possible number (8) through (15) by lling in one
box for each possible number.
If you get number (8): Would you like to receive $49 today or $50 in six months
If you get number (9): Would you like to receive $47 today or $50 in six months
If you get number (10): Would you like to receive $44 today or $50 in six months
If you get number (11): Would you like to receive $40 today or $50 in six months
If you get number (12): Would you like to receive $35 today or $50 in six months
If you get number (13): Would you like to receive $29 today or $50 in six months
If you get number (14): Would you like to receive $22 today or $50 in six months
If you get number (15): Would you like to receive $14 today or $50 in six months
[Blue Block; t = 6,  = 1]
SIX MONTHS FROM TODAY VS. SEVEN MONTHS FROM TODAY WHAT WILL YOU DO IF YOU
GET A NUMBER BETWEEN 16 AND 22? Decide for each possible number if you would like the smaller
payment for sure in six months or the larger payment for sure in seven months? Please answer for each
40possible number (16) through (22) by lling in one box for each possible number.
If you get number (16): Would you like to receive $49 in six months or $50 in seven months
If you get number (17): Would you like to receive $47 in six months or $50 in seven months
If you get number (18): Would you like to receive $44 in six months or $50 in seven months
If you get number (19): Would you like to receive $40 in six months or $50 in seven months
If you get number (20): Would you like to receive $35 in six months or $50 in seven months
If you get number (21): Would you like to receive $29 in six months or $50 in seven months
If you get number (22): Would you like to receive $22 in six months or $50 in seven months
41